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Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2304 (2016), in which the Council requested me to present, within 90 days, recommendations on the steps to adapt the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to the situation on the ground and to increase the efficiency of the implementation of its mandate, including with respect to strengthening the safety and security of United Nations personnel and facilities.

2. For the preparation of the present report, a strategic assessment of the situation in South Sudan was conducted by the Secretariat, with the close collaboration of UNMISS and the United Nations country team. The assessment was conducted through consultations with a wide cross-section of stakeholders, including government officials at the national and local levels, internally displaced persons, representatives of the diplomatic community in Juba, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, donors, UNMISS, States members of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and officials of the African Union Commission.

II. Findings resulting from the strategic assessment

Political dynamic

3. Many stakeholders with whom the strategic assessment team met posed questions surrounding the continued viability of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan following the outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016 and the subsequent flight of Riek Machar from the country. With the overhaul of opposition leadership in the Transitional Government of National Unity by the President, Salva Kiir, including the appointment of Taban Deng Gai in place of Mr. Machar as First Vice-President, the opposition is now divided and its leadership and representation in the institutions of transition disputed, thus blurring the legitimacy of the current governmental formation. The principal challenge is the lack of inclusivity in the political process, in particular with respect to Mr. Machar, who retains significant political and military support, and the increasing feelings of

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political marginalization among other ethnic groups, many of which believe that the Government is pursuing a policy of Dinka domination throughout the country.

4. Several assessment team interlocutors noted that the joint transitional institutions, conceived on the basis of the notion of inclusivity, were now only partially inclusive. To that end, the outcomes of the transitional institutions' deliberations will not be genuinely representative of the constituencies for which the departed opposition members, former detainees and other political parties spoke. Inclusivity therefore needs to be restored as an urgent priority if the transition's political credibility is to be maintained and partners are to continue to support it.

5. The IGAD-Plus formula, which leveraged significant regional and international pressure that led to the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015, has yet to fully remobilize to address the current situation. Some of the guarantors of the peace agreement have undertaken bilateral contacts with the parties to urge them in the direction of peace and dialogue. Nevertheless, in contrast with the days leading to the signing of the agreement, there have been no organized efforts by the guarantors to that end. While it was clear from the assessment team's discussions in Addis Ababa that the region remained committed to ensuring a successful peace process, some recognized that there might be a general sense of fatigue with respect to the conflict and the inability of the country's leaders to commit to the political process. In the absence of any concerted or formal efforts to revitalize the political process since the Second IGAD-Plus Extraordinary Summit on the Situation in the Republic of South Sudan, held on 5 August 2016, efforts to engage the parties have been desultory and unsynchronized. IGAD and African Union interlocutors expressed a desire to enhance collaboration with the United Nations to revitalize the political process.

6. Strong expressions of support were voiced for engaging Mr. Machar and other marginalized leaders of the opposition on the basis of the recognition that failing to do so could drive him to a military solution to address their grievances. Government interlocutors in Juba also supported dialogue with him and recommended that the United Nations seek to engage him to that end, in particular in the light of his recent call to arms, which they urged the United Nations to condemn. Members of the diplomatic community in Juba and Addis Ababa stressed that inclusivity did not mean simply engaging Mr. Machar and his Nuer constituency; other groups that felt politically marginalized should also be brought into dialogue so that they could peacefully express their misgivings. Similarly, some interlocutors suggested that inclusivity did not mean that Mr. Machar had to return as First Vice-President; he could instead designate his representatives in the transitional institutions. Others recalled the IGAD-Plus decision of 5 August, which provided for a return to the status quo ante, and expressed the view that that decision was still valid.

7. The identification of incentives and disincentives to encourage the parties to resume the political dialogue and cease hostilities was viewed as critical by the assessment team's interlocutors in Juba and Addis Ababa. Many stressed that the Security Council should not hesitate to make use of all the tools at its disposal to address the deteriorating situation, including targeted sanctions and an arms embargo. Conversely, should the Government take steps to genuinely promote an inclusive political process, its efforts should be fully supported. The interlocutors

emphasized the need to provide enhanced economic and financial assistance should progress be made towards transparency and improved governance.

8. Stakeholders also felt that the establishment of a hybrid court was an initiative that should continue to move forward with haste. The court would act as a strong deterrent to those who continue to violate human rights, support the fight against impunity in South Sudan and serve ultimately as a tool for longer-term reconciliation.

9. The assessment team discussed the regional protection force at length with government interlocutors, in particular those issues concerning troop composition, tasking and freedom of movement. The team stressed that it was essential that the Government accept the force and its proposed troop-contributing countries as a package and extend all cooperation necessary to allow it to deploy and operate according to the mandate set out in resolution 2304 (2016). Other stakeholders in Ethiopia and South Sudan expressed their support for the force and their hopes for its speedy deployment as a way of improving security and creating space for a meaningful political process. Those issues are reflected in more detail in the 30-day report provided to the Council on the matter.

Security dynamic

10. There were serious concerns expressed in the region that the split within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition), the general discontent among many Nuer and other communities and the pervasive resort to military conflict instead of dialogue threatened to worsen the security outlook. It was recognized that the security environment in the coming months would also be affected by the manner in which Mr. Machar's call for an armed resistance was heeded by his supporters. Should the Nuer and other sympathetic communities respond to his appeal, many feared that human rights violations against civilians would increase dramatically, with the risk of widespread mass atrocities in the context of a full-scale civil war. In such an eventuality, and notwithstanding renewed efforts to develop robust contingency plans across the military component, UNMISS would be ill placed to have any material impact on the situation. It was agreed that pervasive feelings of alienation among other ethnic groups would likely fuel the conflict and add complexity to the security landscape at the subnational level.

11. Hostilities between pro-Machar and pro-Deng groups have already taken place, and even though the full extent of the fragmentation of the opposition remains to be seen, it is expected to have an extremely negative impact on the security dynamic in the country. In the greater Upper Nile region, in particular, where Mr. Machar retains a large base of support, fighting is expected as different commanders choose their allegiance. There is also the distinct probability of further operations by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to take advantage of the increasingly fractured opposition throughout that region. In Upper Nile, the allegiance of General Johnson Olony and the Shilluk population will shape how future fighting materializes in the area. In Unity, the forces are in close proximity throughout the area. Fighting must therefore be anticipated between the opposition loyal to Mr. Machar, estimated to be a majority in the area at present, and those loyal to Mr. Gai. The security dynamic in Jonglei is currently less volatile, but

significant clashes must be anticipated if SPLA moves against the wider Nuer populace. There is a lull in fighting in the immediate area of Wau, Western Bahr el-Ghazal, but the sides appear to be poised for further confrontation. In the Equatorias, SPLA is likely to continue with its activities to defeat anti-government and opposition fighters to ensure that opponents cannot consolidate and mount a threat to Juba.

12. Interactions with internally displaced persons in Wau, Malakal and Bentiu illustrated the extent to which the country is now plagued by a diverse set of local-level conflicts that relate to the national crisis in different ways and to different extents. These local conflicts have been exacerbated by the introduction of the 28-state structure, which has served to heighten ethnic tensions, shift political loyalties and increase competition for power and resources in a deteriorating economy. Internally displaced persons who expressed scepticism regarding the possibility of reconciling with neighbours from other ethnic groups provided a sobering warning of the level to which local conflicts were destined to continue. The deep divisions already created between communities and the strong desires for vindication among those who have suffered at the hands of their neighbours will continue to drive violence at the subnational level in the coming period. Internally displaced persons who met with the strategic assessment team again expressed their strong hope to return and urged the international community to deploy the regional protection force as quickly as possible.

13. The inability to integrate the forces and transform the army into a professional, unified and ethnically diverse entity, separate from political interests, remains a key security challenge to the achievement of a sustainable peace for South Sudan. Poor discipline and weak command and control of elements of the national security forces continue to have a negative impact on the security situation. The Government's irregular payment of salaries to security personnel presents an additional risk, given that unpaid soldiers often use violence to obtain resources from civilians. Furthermore, the proliferation of armed groups in the country with distinct agendas has created a very dangerous security dynamic that will likely be difficult to reverse even if the main parties to the conflict eventually reach a political settlement. Should the current situation persist, more armed groups with disparate aims and objectives are likely to enmesh South Sudan in a semi-permanent state of conflict.

Human rights and the rule of law

14. The heightened violence following July 2016 has had devastating consequences for civilians. Widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been committed, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, rape and other acts of sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention, targeted attacks against civilians, violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population and attacks on medical facilities, aid workers, medical workers and media personnel. All parties to the conflict have continued to use rape and other forms of sexual violence as a tactic of warfare, targeting, in particular, women and girls of various ethnic groups. Some violations are taking on an increasingly ethnic dimension, and hate speech is on the rise throughout the country. These trends raise reasonable concerns that larger-scale atrocities could follow, including ethnic cleansing campaigns.

15. Human rights officers face limited access to affected areas to corroborate information or interview witnesses and victims for many reasons, including restrictions imposed by government authorities, security considerations for staff members and increasing threats of reprisal against witnesses, victims and sources, which raises the need to ensure their protection.

16. Rule of law institutions are weak owing to politicization and inadequate human and financial resources. Likewise, medical and psychosocial care for survivors of sexual violence remains inadequate. The impact of an ineffective police force, a dysfunctional judiciary and a weakened customary justice system is a daunting challenge to overcome and risks contributing to a relapse into intense conflict. Impunity remains entrenched and law and order services have not been restored. Furthermore, civil society and freedom of speech are increasingly under attack. Government interlocutors denied the existence of such restrictions and said that they had prosecuted critics only for engaging in hate speech or defamation. The authorities said that they had received very few complaints of human rights violations by South Sudanese citizens but had responded promptly when such complaints were made. For example, they stated that courts martial were set up to punish "rogue elements" who had committed crimes during the July clashes, notwithstanding concerns that such cases should be under the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Humanitarian crisis

17. The humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is increasing in scale and depth following the July 2016 violence, owing to armed conflict in several parts of the country, worsening food insecurity and the escalating economic crisis. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes since the violence. More than 323,000 people, mostly women and children, have fled to neighbouring countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Uganda, bringing the total number of South Sudanese refugees to more than 1 million. Of the 1.6 million internally displaced persons, some 200,000 have sought refuge in United Nations protection of civilians sites, while the remaining displaced persons are on the run or seeking shelter beyond the sites.

18. The people of South Sudan are facing alarming levels of food insecurity. An estimated 4.8 million people are thought to be severely food-insecure. Global acute malnutrition rates are above the 15 per cent emergency threshold in 7 of 10 states and approximately double the emergency threshold in Unity (26.2 per cent) and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (33.3 per cent). In August, staple food prices were at record-high levels in Juba, Wau and Aweil, reaching nearly 10 times the five-year average, further compounding the situation. Diseases endemic to South Sudan continue to cause death and illness, and the country is suffering a cholera outbreak for the third year in a row.

19. Humanitarian actors noted the array of challenges that they continue to face, including attacks, harassment, intimidation, access constraints and bureaucratic impediments. In the first nine months of 2016, more than 641 humanitarian access incidents were reported across South Sudan. On average, 70 per cent of these included violence against aid workers and assets. At least 67 aid workers have been killed since December 2013, including 13 since the July violence. Humanitarian

supplies have been looted throughout South Sudan, including from the warehouse in Juba belonging to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, resulting in losses of more than $28 million. Underfunding of the humanitarian response remains a challenge, with only 63 per cent of a highly prioritized appeal received as of October 2016.

20. While the Government assured the strategic assessment team that it had put in place several measures to ensure free, safe and unhindered access to all people in need, those assurances have not been translated into a significant improvement in the overall operating environment for humanitarian actors. The Government has established a humanitarian high-level oversight committee, charged with addressing and resolving issues relating to humanitarian access. Participants in the first meeting of the committee, held on 26 October, discussed a range of critical issues that continue to have an impact on the humanitarian response, such as the safety and security of aid workers, free, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and negative rhetoric. While welcoming the corrective measures that were agreed upon, the humanitarian community reiterated that the committee must deliver immediate results.

Economic stresses

21. There were strong concerns expressed by the diplomatic community in Juba and by interlocutors in Addis Ababa over the state of the economy of South Sudan. The overall economic outlook remains dire owing to global oil price volatility, a sharp reduction in oil production, a lack of fiduciary accountability and the depletion of the foreign exchange reserves at the Bank of South Sudan. The country is expected to face a fiscal deficit of approximately 23 per cent during the period 2016-2017 and the South Sudanese pound faces significant downside pressures and has sharply lost value against the United States dollar. This situation has led to steeply rising inflation, and the Government is now unable to pay regular salaries to public servants, including those in the security sector. The annual rate of inflation stands at an alarming 661.3 per cent and the cost of living has risen exponentially, with the annual consumer price index increasing by 730 per cent from August 2015 to August 2016, the highest year-on-year inflation rate in the world.

III. Priority objectives for the Mission

22. In the light of the concerns expressed by stakeholders and the likelihood that the situation will continue to be marked by political volatility, violent conflict, widespread human rights abuses, the further displacement of civilians, significant food insecurity and ongoing humanitarian needs in the near to medium term, it is recommended that the future mandate of UNMISS be based on the priority objectives set out below. Those objectives take into account the requirement that the Mission continue to carry out the core pillars of its existing mandate, including targeted support for institutions of the peace agreement that could have a positive impact on the people of South Sudan and/or UNMISS operations, and advocate a genuine and sustainable cessation of hostilities. As a critical part of the efforts outlined below, the Secretariat would develop a comprehensive political strategy, in close consultation with the African Union and IGAD, to achieve a cessation of

hostilities and bring the parties back to an inclusive political process. The creative and flexible use of the presence of the United Nations in the region, including the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the United Nations Office to the African Union, in support of the efforts by UNMISS and my Special Representative for South Sudan would be leveraged for the implementation of such a comprehensive strategy.

A. Political support for the implementation of the peace agreement

Provide good offices to reinvigorate momentum towards a sustainable political process

23. In the current context, the primacy of a political solution should be at the forefront of the collective efforts of the United Nations, which would require continuous engagement with IGAD and the African Union to reinvigorate momentum towards an inclusive political process. In that regard, my Special Representative for South Sudan would engage with the members of IGAD-Plus, or any future political formation, and other partners on the peace process in South Sudan to ensure coordination and promote sustained and unified political engagement with the parties and to encourage a return to a credible political process and the establishment of inclusive governance. Such efforts would be carried out with support from my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and my Special Representative to the African Union based in Addis Ababa.

24. At the national level, in order to support a political process in which key constituencies in South Sudan feel that they have credible and empowered representation, my Special Representative for South Sudan and the Mission would use their good offices with the parties and other South Sudanese stakeholders, in close coordination with the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, to facilitate an inclusive dialogue among stakeholders. My Special Representative would also work with the parties and other key stakeholders to achieve a lasting cessation of hostilities in order to create an environment in which the political process can take root. To that end, a close partnership with the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, Alpha Oumar Konaré, would be essential. I would propose that the Mission be empowered to support his engagement in the country and in the region.

25. At the subnational level, my Special Representative for South Sudan and the Mission would continue to use their good offices to mitigate intercommunal violence emanating from the 28-state order or other issues dividing communities and leading to violence against civilians. They would also continue to exercise their good offices to advocate that the government authorities at all levels uphold their responsibility to protect civilians. In view of the spectre of new mass atrocities in the coming months, my Special Representative will develop, with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, an action plan to try to prevent and contain their recurrence.

B. Efforts to improve the security situation

Provide advisory support and specialized assistance to the South Sudan National Police Service

26. The current situation does not allow for the Joint Integrated Police to be structured along the lines of its original concept, which foresaw an equitable share of police from the Government and the opposition. Accordingly, it is impossible for the Joint Integrated Police to achieve its original intent, which was to provide the nucleus of an integrated police service while building confidence among internally displaced persons in the protection of civilians sites that they had representation in the security services and could therefore return to their homes. While the Joint Integrated Police is not a viable mechanism, given the current conditions, demilitarizing the security sector and moving towards police primacy in Juba and other urban centres would have a beneficial impact on the citizens of those areas. Should inclusivity one day be attained, the Joint Integrated Police could also act as part of the exit strategy for the regional protection force, given that the former could assume security duties in Juba. In the meantime, it is recommended that the United Nations work with the South Sudan National Police Service to support its training and provide specialized assistance in the urban centres (Juba, Bentiu, Malakal and Bor), in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, including vetting to ensure that no support is provided to human rights violators. United Nations support for the National Police Service would be carried out with the objective of ultimately creating an integrated, ethnically representative and accountable police force. Building on existing working relationships, the Mission's support would focus on training in professional ethics, basic human rights and community-oriented policing, in coordination with partners in the United Nations country team. The Mission's quick-impact projects will also be strategically allocated to support host communities and the National Police Service, especially near the UNMISS protection of civilians sites, with the aim of improving safety and security around those sites.

Support the Juba Joint Operations Centre

27. Without the representation of a large segment of SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Juba, the original purpose of the Joint Operations Centre, namely, to deconflict the movements of government and opposition forces throughout the capital, is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, planning discussions with the Government have suggested that the Centre format could act as a vehicle to coordinate the movements of SPLA, the South Sudan National Police Service and the regional protection force in Juba to ensure the coordination of the tasks and operations set out in Security Council resolution 2304 (2016). Such a mechanism in Juba will be critical, given the weak command and control within SPLA, the presence of security personnel who are often quick to escalate violence in routine encounters with the Mission, and the possibility of minor incidents between uniformed personnel degenerating into large-scale violence against the Mission. It is therefore recommended that the Centre be supported, bearing in mind that it must not become an instrument for controlling the movements of the regional protection force. The operational independence of the force cannot be sacrificed. Accordingly, the terms of reference and modus operandi of the Centre will have to be revised.

Support the monitoring, investigation, verification and resolution of violations of the ceasefire through the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism

28. Under the peace agreement, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism was designed to include representation of the signatories so that transparent monitoring of the ceasefire and the implementation of the security arrangements could take place. Without the representation of a large segment of SPLM/A in Opposition in the Mechanism, the transparency of that monitoring no longer exists. Similarly, with the departure of Mr. Machar and the ongoing hostilities between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition and between the Deng and Machar factions of the SPLM/A in Opposition, it is clear that the ceasefire is no longer in effect. The security arrangements in Juba, which were designed to accommodate forces of the Government and those of a unified opposition, are no longer relevant, nor does the possibility of credibly monitoring the implementation of those arrangements currently exist.

29. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned challenges and the Government's lack of willingness to cooperate with the Mechanism, the Mission should continue to support the Mechanism. Continued monitoring of the situation on the ground, however restricted, can act as a deterrent to hostilities by identifying those parties that have acted in breach of their obligations and could be subject to punitive measures. Furthermore, the Mechanism maintains contact with a number of SPLM/A in Opposition representatives on the ground. Retaining open lines of communication with the parties to the conflict is essential and aids in allowing for a greater situational awareness with respect to hostilities on the ground and how they might be mitigated.

30. Should the parties agree to a cessation of hostilities and return to the political dialogue, it will be important that they recommit themselves to the cantonment of forces and implement any future security arrangements so as to provide political space for the establishment of inclusive governance. Continued Mission support for the Mechanism will enable it to immediately begin monitoring the parties' actions in respect of their commitments should the ceasefire take hold and will prevent any operational interruptions that could challenge the resumption of its work.

C. Protection of civilians

Protect and deter violence against civilians, including in areas of origin and of displacement

31. Given the current environment in which the Government and other parties continue to attack civilians, the existing rhetoric against the United Nations and the protection of civilians sites, the challenges facing the Mission in terms of accessing vulnerable civilians outside the sites and the lack, at times, of a consistent, proactive and outward-facing posture to protect civilians, the Mission's limitations with respect to the implementation of its protection of civilians mandate must be recognized. In addition to the above challenges, more than 200,000 civilians are currently housed in the seven protection of civilians and adjacent sites throughout the country, a caseload that places significant demands on nearly every aspect of the

Mission's capabilities. Should increased fighting lead to further displacement and an increased influx of civilians into the protection of civilians sites, the Mission's capacity to defend and maintain order within the sites will likely be overwhelmed, further reducing its ability to influence events outside the sites. In carrying out its protection of civilians mandate in the current setting, the Mission will have to continue to carefully weigh its ability to extend protection into areas of origin and displacement against its responsibilities vis-à-vis the protection of civilians sites and staff security. Nevertheless, protection of civilians will continue to be given priority in decisions on the use of available capacity and resources.

32. The impact of the regional protection force in Juba and the reorganization of Mission capabilities will need to be evaluated once the force is deployed. Doing so will help to inform the requirement for any additional capabilities needed to project troops outside United Nations bases for the protection of civilians. Recommendations to that end would be made to the Security Council on the basis of a subsequent review and military capability study.

Strengthen mechanisms for conflict management, peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and social cohesion, in particular at the community level

33. While the space for political engagement at the national level continues to be restricted, there appears to be more room to engage with communities and authorities at the local level. Mobilizing local populations towards peace and reconciliation is a vital part of the effort to repair the country's social fabric and reverse the ethnicization that characterizes the current national crisis. Efforts to create a culture of peace throughout South Sudan will create a more substantial base for any political process at the national level, while also helping to prevent and mitigate intercommunal violence at the local level. Such direct engagement with communities has positive societal implications, provides strong protection of civilians input and will help to lay the groundwork for the eventual return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and vulnerable populations.

34. Creating and supporting peace efforts at the subnational level creates opportunities for the Mission, in collaboration with the United Nations country team, to engage a broad range of relevant stakeholders, including churches, civil society, traditional bodies and influential figures in the community context. Doing so can produce tangible results at the intercommunal level and serves to manage their expectations and raise their understanding of the roles and responsibilities of government.

35. Local engagements, in collaboration with the United Nations country team, to reconcile communities in conflict include a range of activities, such as enhancing the capacity of the Council of Traditional Authority Leaders to put into operation local traditional mechanisms for dialogue and reconciliation. Additional activities will include helping government and local stakeholders to manage resource-based cross-border intercommunal conflict and providing support to survivors of trauma and sexual and gender-based violence in the community.

36. The Mission's increased focus on strengthening mechanisms for peaceful coexistence at the community level should be understood as a front-line protection intervention and part of an overarching political strategy. Such efforts should also

help to improve the public perception of UNMISS and of the United Nations as a whole.

Maintain public safety and security within protection of civilians sites

37. The Mission is proposing to increase and improve its patrolling in the areas immediately surrounding the protection of civilians sites, where sexual violence and other threats to civilians have proliferated. To that end, the Mission will implement integrated patrols that include military, police and civilian staff members, in particular human rights officers and women's protection advisers. Dismounted patrols by the military and police components in those areas will also be conducted throughout the night, when violence against civilians is pervasive. The newly established weapon-free zone around the sites in Juba has already helped to increase visibility in those areas and will be replicated in the other sites.

38. Given the current security environment, the United Nations presence in South Sudan must accept that civilians will continue to seek refuge in the protection of civilians sites until there is a significant improvement in the situation and should therefore turn its energies to improving its holistic approach to the management of the sites. Utilizing their comparative advantages, UNMISS and humanitarian actors should seek to improve their collaboration, better delineate roles and responsibilities, attempt to identify joint solutions to problems and plan for medium- and long-term programme engagement in the sites.

39. Accordingly, it is recommended that UNMISS be responsible for ensuring the external security of the sites and their immediate surroundings, while strengthening its engagement with internally displaced persons and local communities to ensure the civilian character of and safety and security within and around the protection of civilians sites. Humanitarian actors should be responsible for the management of the sites and the provision of services therein. UNMISS and humanitarian actors that have experience with the identification of combatants in camps for internally displaced persons and refugees would implement screening measures to better protect the civilians in the sites and ensure that they are not used as a refuge for those involved in hostilities. To be effective, such measures must be supplemented by improved perimeter protection in order to keep out combatants who might seek to circumvent screening.

40. An additional 196 individual police officers are also recommended to enhance internal security measures. This will include quick-reaction responses to security incidents and public order situations, early warning through the collection, analysis and reporting of security information, support for humanitarian agencies during food distribution and registration processes, the management of holding facilities, support for community policing concepts under the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations arrangement, and the implementation and monitoring of and reporting on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, violations against children and arbitrary or prolonged detentions.

Conflict-related sexual violence

41. The level of conflict-related sexual violence remains an increasing source of concern, as is the threat of further violence, in particular against women and girls.

Accordingly, UNMISS will strengthen its work towards the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013) by monitoring, analysing and reporting on patterns and trends in conflict-related sexual violence and strengthening internal capacity in that regard through training; prevention, including through the use of early warning indicators on conflict-related sexual violence; and efforts to address accountability. From an operational standpoint, the Mission will increase high-visibility foot patrols outside the protection of civilians sites, with a particular focus on the newly established weapon-free zone surrounding the sites in Juba, and at key crossing points where sexual violence crimes have been concentrated. The Mission will also explore the use of unarmed civilian protection techniques to enhance its ability to protect civilians, in particular those threatened with sexual violence. UNMISS and United Nations agencies will undertake activities relating to advocacy, mainstreaming, training and capacity-building and raising awareness inside and outside the Mission on conflict-related sexual violence concerns to enhance prevention and better respond to survivors' needs. The Mission will also continue to coordinate the conflict-related sexual violence mandate, provide senior-level engagement with and technical support for the parties and advocate the integration of prevention and accountability with regard to such violations within any future efforts relating to transitional justice, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Child protection

42. Grave and widespread violations against children continue to be committed by all parties to the conflict in South Sudan, with a significant spike noted during the second half of 2016 in reports of the recruitment and use of children, the killing and maiming of children and sexual violence against children. UNMISS should continue to work with partners on the monitoring, verification and reporting of the six grave violations against children, in line with the Security Council's mandate on children in armed conflict, and to support the parties to conflict in the implementation of their respective action plans signed with the United Nations in-country to halt and prevent grave violations against children.

43. The Mission should continue to advocate that children be immediately and unconditionally released by the parties and that the Government act upon its repeated commitment since 2012 to take measures to halt and prevent grave violations against children committed by SPLA. UNMISS should also follow up with SPLM/A in Opposition on its commitment made in late 2015 to release all children from their ranks without further delay. UNMISS should work closely with the United Nations country team to regain unimpeded access to affected communities to ensure timely humanitarian assistance and support for child victims and their families and to verify reports of grave violations against children.

D. Human rights

Monitor, investigate, verify and report on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

44. The deterioration of the human rights situation requires the continued active engagement of UNMISS in the monitoring, investigation, verification and regular

public reporting of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, with a particular focus on gross violations, violations against children and conflict-related sexual violence, as well as the ethnic dimensions of such violations.

45. Accurate and timely human rights monitoring and public reporting are needed to inform international and regional responses to mass atrocities and efforts to hold perpetrators to account, including by pinpointing individual responsibilities. Of particular importance is the work of UNMISS in monitoring situations of rising intolerance, hate speech and emerging patterns of violations affecting specific groups. The identification of early warning signals is key to ensuring a timely response, holding those responsible to account for what could happen and mobilizing key stakeholders to prevent further escalation.

46. Given the increasingly hostile environment for human rights work in the country, UNMISS should prioritize capacity-building and support for defenders and strengthen its efforts to protect those who suffer reprisals for engaging with the United Nations. Advocacy on the importance of respecting freedom of expression and the need to preserve democratic space in the country should increase.

47. In the area of transitional justice, the United Nations should focus its efforts on the need to develop a more enabling and safe environment for transitional justice. To that end, UNMISS and the United Nations country team should continue to work to raise human rights awareness and capacity within key State institutions. The development of specific programmes and strategies aimed at empowering victims must accompany such efforts. Of critical importance for enhancing accountability is the establishment of the hybrid court, which the United Nations must encourage through its advocacy and expertise in the area.

48. Human rights monitoring should also continue to focus on justice, law enforcement and security sector institutions to assess their compliance with human rights standards and the rule of law. The Mission's mandate explicitly provides for unconditional access to all detention centres and other holding facilities in South Sudan for the purpose of the comprehensive monitoring and assessment of prolonged and arbitrary arrests and detention.

49. The Mission should continue to advocate the ratification of the remaining core human rights treaties and the harmonization of national legislation. Equally important is advocacy with the Government to fulfil its reporting obligations under the international and regional human rights treaties to which it has acceded, as well as to continue its cooperation with the Human Rights Council and regional mechanisms.

Human rights due diligence policy

50. Support for several security structures provided for in the peace agreement, including the South Sudan National Police Service and the Joint Operations Centre, will require that the Mission have strengthened capacity to adequately implement the human rights due diligence policy.

E. Creation of conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance

Contribute to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance

51. As the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen and spread, the operating environment is likely to become increasingly complex and dangerous. Active conflict, restrictions on freedom of movement, and unexploded ordnance are likely to limit the ability of both humanitarian actors and UNMISS to reach people in need. Humanitarian organizations continue to strengthen their own ability to undertake discrete access negotiations in order to be able to move freely and safely throughout the country. There are times, however, when UNMISS can make valuable contributions to humanitarian action by providing specific capabilities and capacities in order to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance as a measure of last resort.

52. In close coordination with humanitarian actors, UNMISS should continue to contribute to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance so as to enable, in accordance with humanitarian principles, the rapid, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel and assets to all those in need.

F. Rule of law and security institutions

53. While the peace agreement calls for broad reforms in the area of security and justice sectors, the Government has made little genuine progress on those fronts. With respect to the Mission's undertaking in this area, it is believed that it would be ill timed to engage in security sector reform or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in the absence of an inclusive political process and in support of a national security architecture that does not currently include a large segment of the fighting forces in the country. It is recommended, therefore, that any future support for security sector reform or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration be predicated on the re-establishment of representative and inclusive bodies, including the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board. In the meantime, I recommend that the Mission's rule of law and security institutions efforts during the coming mandate period focus on supporting the South Sudan National Police Service as described above and on monitoring the implementation of the transitional security arrangements and the transitional justice aspects of the peace agreement. In addition, the Mission's provision of advice to the United Nations system in South Sudan on those issues, with a view to developing a strategy for support for prioritized reforms in the rule of law sector during the transitional period, will be important in view of the need to demilitarize the security sector.

54. Improving the management of the holding facilities in the protection of civilians sites is also a priority. As with those sites, UNMISS will need to maintain the holding facilities for the foreseeable future. While there have been significant improvements in the holding facilities in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal, continued adjustment to the management of and the security, infrastructure and conditions in the facilities is required. Additional efforts are also needed to find a way, consistent with international humanitarian and human rights law, to hand over to the South

Sudanese authorities those detainees suspected of having committed serious crimes. To that end, it will be necessary to develop a strategy to strengthen the management of the facilities and formulate a process for the handover of detainees.

G. Continual development and strengthening of the security risk management strategy and process to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, United Nations mandate implementation and programme delivery

55. The measures set out below have been identified in line with paragraphs 6 and 18 of Security Council resolution 2304 (2016), in which the Council requested that I provide recommendations for enhancing the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

56. The United Nations security management system in South Sudan relies on the host Government for the provision of adequate security and other relevant cooperation, as outlined in the status-of-forces agreement. Nevertheless, in the current volatile political environment, the Government's cooperation with the United Nations has been minimal and status-of-forces agreement violations are widespread. In that regard, robust political engagement is paramount to ensure that the host Government assumes its responsibility to protect United Nations personnel and assets and that there is more effective liaison and improved coordination with its security agencies.

57. Top priority will be given to strengthening and improving perimeter defence arrangements, ensuring round-the-clock medical care and evacuation arrangements, the hardening of office and accommodation walls and the construction of sufficient indirect fire shelters.

58. It is believed that United Nations personnel should reside only in United Nations compounds or safe zones in which they can be safely relocated or extracted in case of a crisis situation. With regard to Juba, Zone 1 in Tomping, in close proximity to Juba International Airport, has been identified as a safe zone. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the established Emergency Response Teams tasked with assisting United Nations personnel in cases of emergency have no extraction capability in non-permissive settings; hence the need for dedicated military support to respond to United Nations personnel safety and security issues during crises.

59. Given that national staff members rarely carry radios owing to associated security concerns, a procedure will be developed to improve their ability to receive timely security information. In that regard, a functional warden system with reliable communications and structure that allows easy accounting for national staff should be developed. Arrangements will need to be put in place to relocate staff from high-risk duty stations to safer United Nations facilities.

IV. Mission support considerations

60. UNMISS has completed the post-December 2013 crisis uplift authorized under Security Council resolution 2155 (2014), which took the Mission from 7,000 to 12,500 troops and up to 1,343 police personnel. Nevertheless, the additional troop and police increases authorized under Security Council resolution 2252 (2015) are facing delays owing to force generation issues and the inherent physical and political challenges of operating in South Sudan. The deployment and sequential absorption of a further 4,000 regional protection force troops will necessitate the realignment of Mission resources. Support for the induction and accommodation of the regional protection force will need to be coordinated closely and pursued in a phased manner to ensure that contingent-owned equipment, accommodation and support requirements are in place.

61. Currently, all major UNMISS locations are at capacity or overstretched in terms of staff, contingents and formed police units, while engineering resources are allocated to priority enhancements to improve the safety and security of United Nations staff. The presence of more than 200,000 internally displaced persons, spread across key UNMISS locations, further exacerbates the operating environment. Road networks are few and in extremely poor condition, and many roads are simply impassable during the rainy season. Barge convoys are routinely delayed for many weeks. Material supplies are backlogged and compete with vital fuel and food supplies for cargo space on finite air assets. Cumulatively, this situation underscores the fact that the Mission has limited absorption capacity and must have clear priorities and compatible resource reallocation.

V. Observations

62. Immediate steps must be taken to reassert the primacy of the political process. The first steps in that regard must be to seek an immediate cessation of hostilities and a commitment to dialogue. As efforts are undertaken to reinvigorate dialogue between the parties, it will be essential to formulate a clear political strategy that leverages the strengths of the region and the international community. Such a strategy must include meaningful incentives and disincentives for those in a position to fuel the current instability or contribute to the future peace of South Sudan. It must be developed quickly, in close consultation with IGAD, the African Union, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and other stakeholders. The Government must be continually reminded that it has the primary responsibility to protect its own citizens and that it must provide such protection regardless of ethnic or political affiliation.

63. There is a very real risk of mass atrocities being committed in South Sudan, in particular following the sharp rise in hate speech and ethnic incitement in recent weeks. It will be important that we define clearly what the United Nations system can and cannot do should mass atrocities occur in South Sudan. While the Secretariat will continue to make every effort to implement the mandated task of protecting civilians through the use of "all necessary means", it must be clearly understood that United Nations peacekeeping operations do not have the appropriate reach, manpower or capabilities to stop mass atrocities. The limits on the Mission's

ability to protect civilians in the current environment have already been demonstrated clearly. In the course of the strategic assessment, the African Union Commission proposed a separate discussion with the United Nations on the issue with the aim of identifying how the two organizations could respond to such an eventuality, including the possible establishment of an over-the-horizon force, in follow-up to the IGAD communiqué of 5 August. I intend to send a delegation to Addis Ababa in response to the Commission's proposal as soon as possible, bearing in mind that such a force would also be an important measure to enhance staff safety and security.

64. I have carefully studied the findings of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence that occurred in Juba between 8 and 25 July. The present report has taken into account the recommendations made by the Independent Special Investigation, which will be taken forward by the Secretariat and the Mission and monitored by a Headquarters-led task force.

65. As I have recommended repeatedly, the Security Council should impose an arms embargo on South Sudan and targeted sanctions on those who seek to obstruct the peace process. South Sudan is inundated with weaponry, which is often turned on defenceless civilians. Under the present circumstances, stopping the flow of additional arms into the country is critical for the protection of civilians. In addition, those with influence in South Sudan who continue to block progress towards a political settlement and prolong human suffering must understand that they will face consequences.

66. The barrage of restrictions that the Government imposes on the freedom of movement and access of UNMISS and humanitarian actors are steadily leading to Mission paralysis and undermining humanitarian operations. UNMISS is routinely unable to patrol in areas in which civilians require protection, and humanitarian colleagues are often unable to access populations in need of urgent relief. The Security Council must hold the Government to account for these obstructions. If not, UNMISS will soon be reduced to inaction. I intend to actively engage the members of IGAD-Plus on status-of-forces agreement violations in order to facilitate their advocacy with the Government to that end.

67. If allowed to deploy and operate in line with its mandate, the regional protection force will be an important instrument for helping to bring stability to Juba and create the political space necessary to facilitate inclusive governance. At the same time, the force should be seen as an additional tool for achieving a political solution to the conflict. The Government should urgently extend its full cooperation to facilitate the early deployment of the force and the full implementation of its mandate.

68. Efforts to implement chapter V of the peace agreement, including the establishment of the hybrid court, should continue. I welcome the intention of the African Union to do so with haste. The lack of accountability for serious violations of human rights in South Sudan perpetuates the conflict. I reiterate the Secretariat's firm commitment to supporting the African Union in putting into operation this important mechanism.

69. Inclusive governance is a sine qua non for peace in South Sudan. Failure to ensure that the voices of South Sudanese are heard and taken into account will only

prolong the conflict and increase feelings of marginalization. The country's political leaders cannot afford to ignore communities with legitimate grievances or those who justifiably want to participate in a free and pluralistic South Sudan. To that end, President Kiir and his Government must make the strategic decision to govern for all people of South Sudan and embrace those voices of dissent that are expressed peacefully. Those who want to participate in the political process must renounce violence, commit to the path of dialogue, embrace transparency and accountability and encourage their followers to do the same.

70. I recommend that the mandate of UNMISS be renewed for one year, along the lines set out in the present report, with a midterm evaluation of progress made by the parties in ceasing hostilities, returning to the path of dialogue and achieving inclusiveness within the Government. Such an evaluation would include a frank assessment of the parties' willingness to work with UNMISS in carrying out its mandated tasks and facilitate the deployment and operations of the regional protection force so that the Security Council can consider what other measures would be required to address the situation.

71. I would like to express my gratitude to UNMISS and the United Nations country team for their support for and participation in the strategic assessment. I would also like to thank the African Union, IGAD, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the diplomatic community in Juba and Addis Ababa and internally displaced persons in the protection of civilians sites and adjacent areas who provided their frank views and constructive opinions to the members of the assessment team.

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Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations policing

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2185 (2014), in which the Council requested me to submit, by the end of 2016, a report on the role of policing as an integral part of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, with particular focus on the challenges faced by police components of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions, and to make recommendations on how best to strengthen their contribution to the achievement of mission mandates. Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 93 of my report entitled "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (A/70/357-S/2015/682), the present report contains my response to the external review of the functions, structure and capacity of the Police Division of 31 May 2016. Notably, it sets out my vision as to how to ensure that the United Nations police is ready to respond effectively to the challenges of the twenty-first century and contains 14 key recommendations that I hope my successor will follow up on. This constitutes my second report on the United Nations police, the first (A/66/615) having been submitted to the General Assembly in December 2011 in response to a request by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see A/65/19, para. 78).

The present report outlines how the environment in which the United Nations police operates has been altered by changing conflict dynamics. The United Nations police now engages in United Nations peace operations and post-conflict and other crisis situations across the entire peace and security spectrum, from conflict prevention and management to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace sustainment. It is often the breakdown of law and order that triggers United Nations deployment and, conversely the establishment or re-establishment of policing and other rule of law functions that allows United Nations peace operations to downsize and eventually withdraw.

Furthermore, the report takes stock of progress made and operational successes, such as the conferral of full responsibilities to host-State police in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone; transition planning in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti; gender-sensitive policing and gender-balancing efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur and Haiti; and evolved integrated rule of law approaches in Mali and Somalia.

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In the report, consideration is also given to the growing importance of the United Nations police to international peace and security, as emphasized by Member States at the first United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit in June 2016 and several peacekeeping summits, and the increased attention given to policing by the Security Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It underscores the most recent global developments, including advances made in the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, to ensure coherence of effort and refine strategic police generation platforms.

At the same time, the report highlights critical challenges, such as the mismatch between mandated policing tasks and the authorized posture and allocated resources. It underscores operational dilemmas, from addressing gaps in the criminal justice chain in the Central African Republic to interpreting public safety and security mandates in South Sudan in a way that both protects internally displaced persons and responds to the perpetrators of threats. My report also illustrates how the political nature of host-State police capacity development as part of larger security sector reform efforts necessitates national ownership and integrated approaches. It also underscores practical challenges pertaining to United Nations police, including welfare, which require action.

The present report presents my vision for a people-centred, modern, agile, mobile and flexible, rights-based and norm-driven United Nations police. To realize this vision, I put forward 14 recommendations, namely: (a) realistic mandates that are adequately resourced and a Police Division that is appropriately staffed and positioned within Secretariat structures; (b) the nomination of Member States' most qualified officers and most able units that are able to deploy rapidly to implement mandated tasks; (c) an audit of selection and recruitment processes to ensure effective and efficient rotations; (d) steps to ensure that deployed police personnel have undergone human rights screening and are held accountable for any criminal acts, including sexual exploitation and abuse; (e) special measures to increase the proportion of female United Nations police to create more inclusive, responsive policing; (f) a review of the formed police unit concepts, capacities and capabilities to improve performance and overall management; (g) enforcement of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping; (h) predeployment, induction and in-mission training that is compliant with the Strategic Guidance Framework, including on the protection of civilians, child protection and conflict-related sexual violence; (i) integration of United Nations policing in effective political solutions; (j) participation of United Nations police in conflict prevention; (k) consolidation of synergies with rule of law, human rights, civilian and military efforts to ensure holistic approaches to the protection of civilians and capacity development; (l) operationalization of comprehensive rule of law support through the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations, including access to necessary funding sources; (m) a coherent approach to preventing and addressing serious and organized crime through access to information exchange networks and the establishment of a dedicated capacity within the Police Division; and (n) appropriately resourced backstopping of special political missions and other planning processes.

Overall, my proposal for overcoming the challenges of United Nations police and realizing my vision will require strong leadership by Member States, the Secretariat and my successor, reinforced partnerships and robust and effective capabilities, including well-trained and well-equipped police with access to the most recent innovations and technology.

I. Background

1. In its resolution 2185 (2014), the Security Council requested that I submit a report by the end of 2016 on the role of policing as an integral part of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, with particular focus on the challenges faced by police components of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions, and making recommendations on how best to strengthen their contribution to the achievement of mission mandates. In line with the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446), I instructed the Police Division to undertake an external review of its functions, structure and capacity (see A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 93). The external review was completed on 31 May 2016.[1] The present report constitutes my response to the request of the Security Council and to the external review, sets out my vision to ensure that the United Nations police is posed to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century and contains 14 recommendations that could be followed up on by my successor.

2. This constitutes my second report on United Nations police. My first report (A/66/615) was submitted to the General Assembly in December 2011, pursuant to a request from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19, para. 78).

II. Introduction

3. The external review, reiterating the findings of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, stressed the significant changes that had taken place in United Nations peace operations and their impact on United Nations policing. In 1960, 30 police monitors deployed to the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Today, approximately 13,500 officers, of whom 10 per cent are women, are deployed in 12 peacekeeping operations and 6 special political missions, where they are assigned a variety of complex tasks (see A/66/615, paras. 9-32). Increasingly robust mandates require police to protect civilians and provide operational support, while also promoting the reform, restructuring and development of host-State capacity. The breakdown of law and order often provides a trigger for the deployment of a United Nations peace operation. Conversely, it is often the establishment or re-establishment of policing and other core functions of the criminal justice chain, in adherence to the rule of law, that allows United Nations peace operations to downsize and eventually withdraw. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and specifically Sustainable Development Goal 16 on the development of effective, accountable and inclusive rule of law institutions, reaffirmed the linkages between security, human rights and development. Thus, by increasing the ability of the host-State's law enforcement and justice institutions to perform their tasks, the United Nations police has become an indispensable instrument in creating an environment in which there is increased political will and capacity that contributes to a mission's exit strategy.

[1] Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/policereview2016.pdf.

III. Changing operating environment

4. In its report, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations determined that United Nations peace operations had proven highly adaptable and had contributed significantly to the successful resolution of conflicts (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, summary). Given the centrality of policing in preventing, mitigating and resolving violent conflict and contributing to early peacebuilding and reconciliation, an effective, capable and delivery-oriented United Nations police must be a key element of United Nations peace operations.

5. Such change must take into account the deteriorating global security environment, which, as I have noted elsewhere (see A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 103) and as also recognized by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see A/70/19, para. 39), has increased the nature and scale of the security challenges faced by United Nations peace operations. The United Nations is a target for direct attack, including asymmetric threats, by some parties and spoilers to peace processes. In certain contexts, this threat is further aggravated by the blurring of lines and collaboration between transnational criminal networks, extremist groups and political actors. In addition, the increased risk of indirect attacks during and following conflict, including a disregard for international humanitarian law, as illustrated by the targeting of civilians, including humanitarian personnel,[2] presents grave risks to the safety, security and livelihoods of communities around the globe, as well as to international peace and security (see A/70/357-S/2015/682, paras. 1-9).

6. The restoration of State authority in remote or contested areas presents a serious challenge, on repercussion being that non-State, and often criminal, actors take advantage of security and governance vacuums. Furthermore, the Organization has been tasked to respond to threats against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence. In South Sudan, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons have sought safety on the premises of peacekeeping operation, and United Nations police have been called upon to take on new tasks, including the provision of public safety and security for those seeking refuge within United Nations premises.

IV. Evolving role and composition of United Nations police

7. The United Nations defines "policing" as a function of governance responsible for the prevention, detection and investigation of crime; the protection of persons and property; and the maintenance of public order and safety. Policing must be entrusted to civil servants who are members of police or other law enforcement agencies of national, regional or local governments, within a legal framework that is based on the rule of law.[3] Police and law enforcement officials[4] have the obligation

[2] See, for example, the report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2016/447).

[3] The rule of law refers to "a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards" (see S/2004/616, para. 6).

to respect and protect human rights. As this understanding of policing must serve as the common denominator for United Nations police officers, who currently come from 87 police-contributing countries with a variety of organizational and legal frameworks, the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping provides comprehensive policy and guidance for United Nations police officers from a diverse range of police-contributing countries to work together efficiently and impartially.

8. The mission of the United Nations police is to enhance international peace and security by supporting Member States in conflict, post-conflict and other crisis situations to realize effective, efficient, representative, responsive and accountable police services that serve and protect the population. To that end, United Nations police build and support, or, where mandated, act as a substitute or partial substitute for, host-State police capacity to prevent and detect crime, protect life and property and maintain public order and safety in adherence to the rule of law and international human rights law. United Nations police pursue community-oriented and intelligence-led policing approaches to contribute to the protection of civilians and human rights; address, among other things, sexual and gender-based violence, conflict-related sexual violence and serious and organized crime; and conduct investigations, special operations and electoral security. They are composed of formed police units (currently 66 per cent), individual police officers (currently 34 per cent), which include specialized teams, contracted seconded police and civilian experts.

9. The work of the United Nations police is undertaken within a framework which includes the principles of security sector reform,[5] peacebuilding and early peacebuilding for peace operations, and encompasses efforts to prevent the outbreak of or relapse into conflict (see A/69/968-S/2015/490, para. 7). Conflict prevention involves both immediate operational activities (stabilization and physical protection) and longer-term structural prevention (building of political will and national capacity) (see A/55/985-S/2001/574, para. 8) within a larger context, including reconciliation and transitional justice as critical factors for sustainable peace.

10. There is also a continuing need to advance gender mainstreaming efforts and the participation of women in the United Nations police (see Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), para. 8). Police services benefit greatly when the experiences and perspectives of women and men are incorporated in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of police legislation, policies and programmes. This includes addressing sexual and gender-based violence, conflict-related sexual violence and the security concerns of women, men, girls and boys. It also requires the building of more democratic, inclusive host-State police services

[4] Including police, gendarmerie, customs, immigration and border services, as well as related oversight bodies, such as ministries of the interior or justice.

[5] Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. As the Security Council noted, security sector reform should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question (see A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 17).

with due regard for gender equality. The inclusion of women in police services provides a greater sense of security overall and improves access to and support from law enforcement agencies to women. As at 30 September 2016, the representation of women among individual police officers and formed police units stood at 19.7 per cent and 6.6 per cent, respectively. In order to reach 20 per cent, continuing efforts will be required by police-contributing countries to increase nominations of women officers and mainstream gender considerations within their national police services.

11. For the most part, the United Nations police comprises police components within United Nations peace operations. Specialized expertise has also been deployed in non-mission settings under the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations arrangement. This has included, for example, deployments to Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone. The United Nations police, in conjunction with mission components, United Nations partners and others, including the African Union, the European Union and INTERPOL, strengthens rule of law capacities and supports security sector reform in host States, in line with international human rights law. This support reinforces national, regional and international efforts to disrupt criminal networks and address key drivers of conflict and violence, as well as social injustice and inequality.

12. Finally, the United Nations police also includes the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with its New York-based sections and the Brindisi-based Standing Police Capacity. At Headquarters, the Police Adviser, supported by the Police Division, is responsible for providing strategic advice and support on all policing issues to senior United Nations officials, as well as to heads of police components of operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs. The Police Adviser also oversees basic support by the Division to police components, including guidance development, planning, selection and recruitment, mission management and backstopping. The Standing Police Capacity provides start-up capacity and technical assistance to field missions, as well as in non-mission settings through the Global Focal Point arrangement, primarily through time-limited deployments.

V. Global developments

13. At the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit in June 2016,[6] United Nations officials and Member States emphasized the centrality of United Nations policing to international security. Furthermore, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2185 (2014) on policing and has requested annual briefings by heads of police components since 2014, as has the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

14. The increased significance of United Nations policing has necessitated the elaboration of more detailed guidance for United Nations police, namely the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, which comprises the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support

[6] For further information, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/initiatives/UNCOPS.shtml.

policy on United Nations police in peacekeeping operations and special political missions and the guidelines on police capacity-building and development, on police command and on police operations. The guidelines on police administration will be completed by the end of 2016. Detailed, field-oriented manuals will follow. While the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework has been slow and deliberately paced, I fully expect that further guidance will be completed expeditiously, as called for in the external review.

15. The Strategic Guidance Framework cannot, however, be seen in a vacuum. It situates United Nations policing in a broader framework, including my Human Rights Up Front initiative (2013); the establishment of the Global Focal Point arrangement (2012); the development of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support policy on the protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping (2015); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights/Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Political Affairs policy on human rights in United Nations peace operations and political missions (2011); the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (2011); the policy on human rights screening of United Nations personnel (2012); and Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) on the application of the relevant standards related to sexual exploitation and abuse that must be met by troop- and police-contributing countries prior to deployment. By the end of 2016, guidance for United Nations police will be further expanded in the revised Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support policy on formed police units, as well as new Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support guidelines on the protection of civilians by United Nations police.

16. Full implementation of these initiatives and guidance will require enhanced predeployment, induction and in-service training to further increase the effectiveness of the United Nations police.[7] In its resolution 49/37, the General Assembly recognized that the training of personnel for United Nations peace operations was the responsibility of Member States. The Strategic Guidance Framework provides police-contributing countries with an overview of the expectations of their officers in the field and desired skill sets. It also renders the role of United Nations police transparent to host States.

17. As the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations noted, closing the gap between what is asked of missions with respect to the protection of civilians and what they can provide requires improvement across several dimensions: assessment and planning, capabilities, timely information and two-way communication, leadership and training, and mandates and expectations (A/70/95-S/2015/446,

[7] As was stated in paragraph 20 of the external review "In service training for [United Nations police] should be greatly enhanced, including training in advising and mentoring skills and on the Strategic Guidance Framework. Given the unique needs of police components in United Nations peace operations, there is a need to better use training capacity and invest in helping bridge the gap between [United Nations police] officers' national experience and their role within peace operations. It is the view of the review team that, even with significant improvements in the provision of appropriately skilled personnel, there will remain a large requirement for United Nations in-service training. The [Strategic Guidance Framework], in addition to skills training, should be an integral part of predeployment, induction and in-service training."

para. 91). To that end, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will closely collaborate on improving performance management frameworks for military, police and civilian components.

18. Ongoing efforts by the Police Division and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Strategic Force Generation and Capability Cell will have all formed police unit commitments registered and managed through the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System by 1 January 2017. At the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, 26 Member States pledged approximately 400 individual police officers, 25 formed police units, 2 special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units, 4 guard units and 8 specialized teams. There were also six pledges of training support. At the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit in 2016, 7 police-contributing countries pledged additional formed police units and 12 police-contributing countries pledged additional individual police officers, which addressed some immediate shortcomings. The United Nations police nevertheless continues to face systemic gaps, including in the ability to deploy rapidly, as well as in their in-theatre mobility, capacity to protect civilians and United Nations personnel and access to advanced police technology, training and extrabudgetary and programmatic funding. Ensuring that formed police units are fit for purpose requires clear oversight of their delivery against mandates.

19. In line with the external review, the Police Division, in consultation with missions and Member States, continues to review standard operating procedures for the selection, assessment and deployment of individual police officers, formed police units and police leadership to enhance the effectiveness of police deployment. It has adjusted its recruitment system by developing separate recruitment streams for command, operations, capacity-building and development, and administration. This is in accordance with the Strategic Guidance Framework and responds to the recommendation of the external review to have separate streams for the deployment of personnel that will be employed in the areas of protection and development, including civilian experts. To increase the timeliness, effectiveness and transparency of the evaluation and selection of candidates, the Police Division is further refining its computerized human resources system to manage all the information on specific individualized skills and cross-check relevant data of the individual police officers with other United Nations entities with respect to mandatory clearances (conduct and discipline and medical clearance and human rights certification provided by Member States). It remains a challenge to sustain a high number of French-speaking officers and units. The Police Division has been working closely with partners such as the International Organization of la Francophonie to improve the nomination and recruitment processes.

VI. Field-related developments

20. United Nations police provide the bedrock of a mission's exit strategy. In Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Liberia, security responsibilities were successfully conferred to the host-State police in 2012, 2014 and 2016, respectively. In Timor-Leste, this handover followed the completion of a joint assessment of the institutional capacities of the national police, in which each Timorese police station was evaluated against agreed indicators of progress set out in a joint development

plan. The planning, assessment and handover process was implemented jointly by the host-State police and United Nations police, including a cadre of 19 civilian police experts, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), other agencies, funds and programmes, and bilateral partners.

21. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations transitioned from a peacekeeping operation to a special political mission and now supports the country through the United Nations country team. Under the Global Focal Point arrangement, United Nations police continued to assist in peace consolidation, following the exit of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone in 2014, deploying the Standing Police Capacity to support ongoing UNDP security sector reform efforts.

22. In 2013, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) supported the national police in a joint assessment exercise to monitor progress and identify priorities for development and reform. Those assessments informed the Government's plan for the UNMIL transition, with security responsibilities handed over from the Mission on 30 June 2016. United Nations police continue to support, inter alia, the development and implementation of key law enforcement legislative, policy and accountability frameworks and intelligence-led and community-oriented policing capacities in Liberia.

23. In Côte d'Ivoire, a joint technical committee, comprising representatives of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire police, the Ivorian national police and gendarmerie and UNDP, was established in June 2016. The committee developed a plan, completed in August 2016, for the transfer of responsibilities from the United Nations police to the relevant government authorities and the United Nations country team.

24. In Haiti, the Haitian National Police Development Plan for 2012-2016, implemented by the police component of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with support from the United Nations country team and bilateral partners, has focused on improving the capacity and operational readiness of the national police. By the end of 2016, the United Nations police will have assisted the national police in increasing its overall personnel to 14,600 officers, 10 per cent of whom are women.

25. Incorporating gender considerations into its work, a specialized sexual and gender-based violence police team in the police component of MINUSTAH developed the capacity of the national police, including the establishment of 13 specialized sexual and gender-based violence police offices, a sexual and gender-based violence classroom at the Police School and an office for the Haitian National Police National Coordinator on Gender and Women's Affairs. In Somalia, the police component of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) assisted the Somali federal police in addressing gender-related crimes. Similarly, the police component of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in collaboration with UNDP, built seven family and child protection units across Darfur to address sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence.

26. A targeted recruitment campaign in Liberia, linked to an accelerated education programme and the implementation of a gender policy, resulted in 18.6 per cent

female representation within the national police. UNOCI advocacy has similarly focused on the integration of women in the national police and the previously all-male gendarmerie. In October 2014, the first 4 women officers joined the gendarmerie; an additional 35 female recruits began training in 2016. The UNOCI police component, with support from UNDP, initiated a project of rehabilitating accommodations at the École de Gendarmerie d'Abidjan, which can house 50 female gendarmes.

27. The United Nations police, together with the task force on human rights due diligence policy in each mission, undertakes risk assessments regarding United Nations police support to non-United Nations security forces, notably host-State police, so as to mitigate potential human rights violations by such forces.

28. Approaches to the rule of law and the role of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions have evolved considerably since 2007. As set out in the presidential statement of the Security Council on the rule of law (see S/PRST/2014/5), supporting national authorities, where mandated, to develop rule of law priorities and strategies to address the needs of police, judicial institutions and corrections systems and their interlinkages is a vital contribution to building peace and ending impunity. Both the efforts and the impact on the ground have increased significantly, and coordination at Headquarters and in the field has improved. In my reports on the rule of law, I have repeatedly stated that there can be no peace without respect for the rule of law and human rights. The challenge is not only to understand the importance of rule of law activities as a pillar of peace operations, but for political strategies to ensure adherence to the rule of law priorities that are necessary for sustainable peace and security, through a coherent response.

29. The United Nations police in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), along with its justice and corrections and mine action components, as well as UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other partners, including the European Union, coordinated their support to the establishment and operationalization of the specialized judicial unit on terrorism and transnational organized crime. It is composed of 12 magistrates, led by a special prosecutor, and a specialized investigation brigade comprised of 50 investigators, and is tasked with addressing terrorism and transnational organized crime as part of a comprehensive investigation/prosecution team. The MINUSMA police and its partners continue to train the Malian security forces, with a focus on the fight against terrorism and serious organized crime, improvised explosive devices threat mitigation, intelligence, investigations and forensics.

30. The United Nations police continues to strengthen host-State capabilities to address serious organized crime, together with INTERPOL, UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, through the joint West Africa Coast Initiative, including the establishment of transnational crime units. In Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI police coordinated activities of UNODC, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and provided expertise to national counterparts in establishing the transnational crime unit. Access to INTERPOL online training and its I-24/7 database allows host-State transnational crime units and the United Nations police to expand their

capacities to gather, analyse and act upon criminal information. This work is increasingly reflected in mandates, such as Security Council resolution 2277 (2016), in which the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was called upon to collect and analyse information on the criminal networks which support armed groups.

31. United Nations police are increasingly called upon to support special political missions, where small, high-impact police components provide strategic advice on the transformation of the police within wider political strategies, as well as critical coordination support to ensure coherent international assistance. In UNSOM, United Nations police contributed, through the Global Focal Point arrangement, to an agreement on a new policing model in a federated Somalia. Given the importance of rule of law and policing in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, resources are needed to ensure adequate Headquarters support to police components in special political missions.

VII. Global and field-based challenges

32. One of the key challenges for United Nations policing is the mismatch between mandated tasks and the posture of the United Nations police and allocated resources at Headquarters and in the field. Mandate implementation is at times hindered by inconsistent planning and unrealistic operational recommendations. These challenges can be exacerbated by a perceived disconnect among the Security Council, the Secretariat and police-contributing countries, as well as the perception that actions of the Secretariat are carried out within organizational "silos".

33. Even innovative approaches by the Security Council, such as the urgent temporary measures in the Central African Republic granting limited authority to carry out policing and law enforcement activities to maintain basic order and combat impunity, have raised challenges for United Nations policing. When the justice chain is ineffective or lacking, how can investigations conducted by United Nations police be brought into the legal framework of a host-State where the mission has been mandated with only some of the attributes of executive policing? This underscores the need for clear, implementable and appropriately resourced mandates.

34. A pragmatic approach is critical. For example, serious crimes committed by internally displaced persons on United Nations premises in South Sudan cannot be investigated and prosecuted by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Yet expelling serious offenders is often, for human rights reasons, not an option. Consequently, UNMISS police are confronted with the challenge of protecting internally displaced persons from serious crime, including by detaining individuals who constitute such threats, based on a mandate to maintain public safety and security within its sites for the protection of civilians, raising new legal and protection issues.

35. As recognized in the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping and by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, capacity-building is inherently political, as well as technical. The host State must be in the lead. Progress must be assessed on the basis of benchmarks and standards.

Any reform effort should be undertaken in close consultation with relevant stakeholders and promote host-State police ownership and accountability. It is imperative that heads of missions utilize United Nations police to prioritize capacity-building and continue to foster political will in support of the protection of civilians and longer-term capacity-building.

36. Wavering host-State commitment can manifest itself in various ways. Lack of political will can hinder or even prevent capacity-building and development. The non-establishment of the Abyei Police Service by the Sudan and South Sudan is a case in point. An unwillingness or inability to implement fundamental reforms, particularly when integrated into broader security sector reform efforts, can further prevent the delivery of mandated tasks. Political processes are essential to long-term peace. Accordingly, the political work of missions must include support to policing reform efforts.

37. Police need to be fully integrated into security sector reform efforts. The perception remains that such efforts are often military-centric, without proper inclusion of other aspects of the security sector. The host State sometimes prioritizes the military to the detriment of the police and the justice system. In its resolution 2151 (2014), the Security Council stressed the importance of security sector reform, including the development of professional, accessible and accountable policing capabilities as well as institutions responsible for oversight and management. Too often, the omission of police in security sector reform priorities leads to otherwise avoidable hard lessons years later. At the same time, many countries in which the United Nations works have no tradition of formal policing, and the traditions that do exist are often highly militarized. Thus, the clear delineation of responsibilities among security entities is critical. We must support the development of emerging police systems but also recognize when the centre of gravity for host-State security lies in alternate or informal security structures.

38. In other cases, host States rely overly on the United Nations to assume policing duties. In Haiti, inadequate budgetary allocations for the national police have negatively affected the ability of the United Nations police to quickly cease operational support to the national police. In the Central African Republic, the Government, notwithstanding its memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), at times seems to have interpreted the mandated urgent temporary measures as transforming United Nations police into the Government's operational arm for conducting sensitive arrests. In Liberia, the inadequate budgetary allocations for the police have led to an overreliance on United Nations police for construction and renovation of police stations and for improved delivery of policing services countrywide. While mandates should prioritize capacity-building, United Nations police and military should not subsume governmental responsibilities in a way that pre-empts the host-State's willingness or ability to restore accountable legal and law enforcement institutions. The greater the commitment of Member States to investing in capacity-building, the more the cost of peace operations will decrease over time.

39. In addition, non-adherence by host States to status-of-forces and status-of-mission agreements, including freedom of movement and visa restrictions, severely limits missions' abilities to deliver on mandated tasks.

40. An integrated approach is essential from the start. United Nations police are a critical element in the initial joint military and police stabilization efforts, as well as the later initiatives on the transition to broader justice and corrections promoting peaceful dispute resolution through host-State rule of law institutions. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA police working with military, justice and corrections components are contributing to restoring law and order through the urgent temporary measures framework. Furthermore, the Bangui Joint Task Force, an integrated police-military structure under one command line, and combined, integrated police-military action, have proven essential in the context of the protection of civilians. The challenge, however, is to maintain a clear understanding of the respective roles of the military and police and their respective rules of engagement and directives on the use of force. Much remains to be done in applying lessons learned from this unique approach combining police and military assets under a unified chain of command.

41. A functioning criminal justice chain is crucial to the protection of civilians. As I have stated before, systematic accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law is crucial to providing redress for victims, deterring further violations and promoting reconciliation (see S/2016/447, para. 18). United Nations police, along with human rights and justice and corrections components, are instrumental in the post-conflict and early peacebuilding phase in supporting the development of host-State institutions to ensure non-discriminatory accountability. Human rights violations need to be addressed by national counterparts, with the support of the mission, as a key deterrent to continuing cycles of violence. Law and order gains in this regard send a strong signal that spoilers cannot act with impunity. However, there are perception risks associated with the United Nations implementing such rule of law tasks, which should be limited in scope and duration. The overall focus should be on supporting the national authorities in undertaking their protection and accountability responsibilities. In extremis, the application of such measures by a peacekeeping operation can lead to allegations that it is not being impartial.

42. Another practical challenge facing United Nations individual police officers, military experts on mission, individually deployed military personnel and other components using government-provided personnel relates to the mission subsistence allowance and the lack of hazard or danger pay. Mission subsistence allowance is not an incentive, but rather compensation for living expenses in the mission area. Existing disparities in conditions of service among different types of personnel continue to pose grave challenges to mandate delivery, especially where colleagues work side by side and perform comparable tasks. This has a detrimental effect on the morale, safety and performance of individual police officers, especially those serving under the most challenging, hazardous conditions, such as in Afghanistan, Libya or Somalia, without the benefit of the hazard pay received by their civilian colleagues. This further hampers the United Nations police in attracting enough high-quality personnel to perform the mandated functions.

43. Finally, national caveats on the deployment and functions of individual police officers and formed police units limit the extent to which those contingents can support mandate implementation. All missions are to report to Headquarters any incidents of refusal to follow orders, whether on grounds of new caveats or for any

other reason (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, paras. 105(c) and 220, and A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 98). The imposition of caveats will also be taken into account by the Secretariat when determining whether or not to proceed with deployment.

VIII. Vision

44. Changing conflict dynamics have transformed United Nations policing. The number of major violent conflicts has almost tripled and communities worldwide are affected by serious, organized and transnational criminal violence. Threats of terrorism, violent extremism and the trafficking of illicit goods and persons are growing more serious. Humanitarian needs, exemplified by the displacement of 60 million persons worldwide, are often driven or exacerbated by conflict. International human rights and humanitarian law are frequently ignored. Where civil strife erupts, fair, impartial law enforcement is typically one of the first state services to erode, often triggering the deployment of United Nations peace operations.

45. The non-existence or weakening of the rule of law, including poor policing practices, not only cause but exacerbate unrest and violations of human rights, often with devastating consequences for communities. As continues to be the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Sudan and elsewhere, United Nations police play a key role in the protection of civilians, bringing to bear skills that complement those of the military or civilian components, in providing physical protection and establishing a protective environment. By supporting host-State police and other law enforcement services in reforming, restructuring and developing their institutions, United Nations police can be essential to the resumption of host-State services and responsibilities.

46. This qualitative shift in requirements for United Nations police is mirrored by an increase in quantitative demand. While the United Nations does not have a monopoly in international policing, it is by far the largest supplier.[8] United Nations police have the ability to help advance political processes by facilitating dialogue and access to a wide range of actors, and they can help improve security and legitimacy, laying the foundations for longer-term institution-building. These comparative advantages uniquely position United Nations police to contribute to comprehensive rule of law assistance and wider political and preventive efforts.

47. At the same time, gains in efficiency and effectiveness can only be attained through continued reinforcement of regional partnerships. This includes support by the Police Division to standardizing the process of rehatting uniformed personnel. Working closely with the African Union and the European Union, the Police Division and its partners are advancing this cooperation to address training, equipment, sustainment and performance standards, conduct and accountability, and logistics support requirements, as recommended by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and in my report entitled "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (see A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 204, and A/70/357-S/2015/682, para. 51).

[8] United Nations police number approximately 13,500, African Union police less than 500 and European Union police less than 1,000.

48. Concerted efforts by Member States, the Secretariat, regional organizations, specialized policing organizations and other partners are required to realize my vision of a transformed United Nations police that is people-centred, modern, agile, mobile and flexible, specialized, rights-based and norm-driven. This vision will require strong leadership and reinforced partnerships. It will also require robust and effective capabilities, such as well-trained and well-equipped police that have access to recent innovations and technology for better performance. The United Nations police will effectively contribute across the entire spectrum of peace and security, from conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and sustainment of peace.

49. During recent peacekeeping summits and the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit, Member States and the international policing community reaffirmed the centrality of the United Nations police in the peace and security agenda. Going forward, there is a need to work together in unprecedented ways and renew the commitment to the United Nations police through innovative political, human and financial investments, a broadened base of police-contributing countries and robust processes that ensure interoperability and interorganizational cohesiveness. In so doing, the Organization will be able to translate this vision of the United Nations police into reality.

IX. Observations and recommendations

50. The report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the external review contain a series of recommendations to improve the performance of the United Nations police.[9] After reflecting on these recommendations, I have formulated the plan of action set out below, which describes specific measures to address the challenges outlined above. The Police Division has been instructed to use this plan of action to create opportunities for both United Nations policing and international policing. Realizing this plan depends on the key cross-cutting enablers of partnerships, critical resources and capabilities and a well-structured and well-functioning Police Division.

51. **Recommendation 1**. The recognized role and importance of United Nations police must translate into strategic but realistic mandates that are adequately resourced. The Police Division must also be appropriately positioned and structured. In line with successive reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see, for example, A/69/19 and A/70/19), Security Council resolution 2185 (2014) and the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/26), this requires close consultation between Member States and the Secretariat prior to and during the lifecycle of a mission. Such consultation is meant to provide strategic advice to the Security Council, in particular on the priorities and sequencing of United Nations police support in specific settings and which capacities are required; align mandates to available capacities; set and adjust expectations for required capabilities, performance

[9] See also the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services entitled "Evaluation of the results of national police capacity-building in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo by United Nations police in MINUSTAH, UNOCI and MONUSCO" (Report No. IED-16-014) (available from https://oios.un.org).

standards and timelines, taking into account the limitations of police-contributing countries; and provide for joint engagement on integrated planning and mission-specific directives on the use of force or concept of operations. On the positioning and structure of the Police Division, I welcome the recommendation of the external review to establish a Police Advisory Committee to further strengthen information exchange and triangular cooperation and encourage Member States to consider having such a subsidiary body to the Security Council or the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. I also encourage the Security Council and the General Assembly to consider the recommendation of the external review regarding the strengthening of the leadership of the Police Division in light of the increasing role that United Nations policing is playing in the maintenance of international peace and security. I also broadly support the proposed new requirements related to mission support, planning, recruitment and strategic analysis set out in paragraphs 174 and 175 of the external review and encourage the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to properly balance the composition of the Police Division.

52. **Recommendation 2**. With the active support of Member States, the Police Division has engaged in strategic police generation initiatives that have contributed to making the United Nations police more results-oriented, focusing on anticipated requirements and demand-driven skill sets using new deployment models, such as specialized teams, civilian experts and a formed police unit standing capacity offering specialized expertise. In order to overcome the serious obstacles to recruiting individual police officers with high-level expertise, attract a new cadre of qualified police leaders for United Nations police command positions through the senior police leadership roster, increase female police participation and generate fully functioning formed police units with more diverse capabilities that could be deployed through the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, I call on Member States to nominate their most qualified officers. The Secretariat will collaborate closely with potential contributors to ensure a shared, forward-looking understanding of required capacities and capabilities, and shortened deployment timelines.

53. **Recommendation 3**. The deployment of trained, well-equipped and fit police officers with the necessary skill sets to United Nations operations at the right time is essential. As noted in the external review, United Nations policing continues to struggle to provide missions with personnel satisfying the full range of capacities necessary to effectively and efficiently implement protection and capacity-building mandates in a timely manner. Closing this gap will require close coordination with Member States. In order to determine how the Secretariat can further improve its selection and recruitment processes, and following on the external review, an internal audit will be conducted of the selection and recruitment processes for United Nations police. Following the audit, I propose that consideration be given to further refining the Police Division architecture through a strategic police generation and recruitment section. Further, I reiterate my call for Member States to ensure that the police personnel that they contribute to peace operations uphold the highest human rights standards and receive predeployment training on protection of civilians, child protection and conflict-related sexual violence, according to United Nations standards. I also call on Member States to ensure prompt investigation in cases of alleged crimes or misconduct. All United Nations police must, furthermore, perform their duties in line with their mandate and directives on the use of force

(see S/2016/447, para. 78(a)). Incidents of non-performance or underperformance should be immediately reported to Headquarters to ensure timely follow-up and accountability, as appropriate.

54. **Recommendation 4**. Recent cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel have gravely endangered the United Nations peace operations enterprise. Contributing countries should assume full responsibility for holding their personnel accountable, including through prosecution, where appropriate, for any criminal acts, including sexual exploitation and abuse, in accordance with due process and consistent with Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) and the Organization's zero-tolerance policy. I welcome the efforts of Member States and the Secretariat to strengthen the vetting of all United Nations police personnel to ensure that they do not have a history of human rights violation, including instances of sexual exploitation and abuse in service with the United Nations, and to comply with all provisions of the policy on human rights screening of United Nations personnel. Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) and the associated operational guidance on its implementation should have a significant impact on efforts already in place to prevent and address misconduct more broadly and sexual exploitation and abuse in particular. The United Nations police will actively support their implementation.

55. **Recommendation 5**. With regard to increasing the participation of women police officers in United Nations peace operations, including command positions, the Secretariat will continue to work closely with Member States and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women to overcome systemic challenges regarding the eligibility of female candidates, such as entry requirements to ensure equal opportunity, including by instituting special measures.

56. **Recommendation 6**. In order to protect civilians and help stabilize communities emerging from conflict, I intend to strengthen the capacity, capabilities and performance of formed police units, in close consultation with Member States, based on a review to be undertaken by the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support. Notably, the evaluation will look at their impact and role within individual missions, as well as challenges related to flexibility, mobility, training and equipment.

57. **Recommendation 7**. United Nations policing services must comply with, and operate on, the doctrinal foundation of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping through: (a) targeted recruitment based on identified field needs, including for special political missions; (b) a solid accountability framework for the implementation of mandates; and (c) continuous monitoring of performance and its improvement through data collection, analysis and implementation of lessons learned. I welcome the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to strengthen the United Nations police knowledge management and training capacity, particularly as it relates to the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping and protection of civilians.

58. **Recommendation 8**. As outlined in my report on the future of United Nations peace operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682), enhancing the predeployment, induction and in-mission training of United Nations police personnel requires a collective

effort by the Secretariat and Member States to ensure deployment readiness and increase performance. This includes, but is not limited to: (a) Member State-provided certification for all police personnel who have completed United Nations-specified predeployment training as part of the police generation process; (b) support to the establishment of bilateral and regional training partnerships; and (c) establishment of a pilot train-the-trainer centre in Entebbe, Uganda, supported by voluntary contributions, to reinforce the role of the United Nations in setting training standards.

59. **Recommendation 9**. Reform efforts undertaken by the United Nations police should inform political processes and be seen as an enabling element that drives the design and implementation of peace operations. Heads of mission should capitalize on United Nations police capacity-building and development initiatives, situational awareness and community relations as resources to bolster capacities to support effective political solutions from the outset of a mission.

60. **Recommendation 10**. It is necessary to respond to the deteriorating police performance of host-State police services, or their politicization or abuse, before conflict erupts, in particular through the participation of the United Nations police in the Organization's mediation and conflict prevention efforts. This will also require a slight augmentation of preventive capacity in the Police Division in New York and its Standing Police Capacity in Brindisi.

61. **Recommendation 11**. Police components are essential to any United Nations rule of law initiative in the field. The heads of police components, in conjunction with heads of missions, must continue to pursue a strategically and operationally integrated approach with their justice, corrections, human rights, security sector reform and other partners to effectively deliver peace dividends on the ground.

62. **Recommendation 12**. Member States and the United Nations system should provide United Nations police, justice and corrections personnel with adequate means to help sustain peace and avoid relapse into conflict, including by further strengthening and expanding the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations arrangement. This must include mutually supportive, interoperable arrangements between the United Nations and other entities, including in non-mission settings, and diversification of the financing of rule of law activities, including through access to assessed mission budgets for programmatic activities in support of mandated tasks, as recommended in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, voluntary trust funds such as the Peacebuilding Fund, mission-specific trust funds, or UNDP thematic or geographic trust funds, as well as strategic partnerships with the World Bank, the European Union and other stakeholders.

63. **Recommendation 13**. Heads of missions should ensure that United Nations police have integrated access to security and information exchange networks in order to facilitate better situational awareness, predictive analysis and early warning information, including on serious and organized crime. This will also allow them to better assist national law enforcement actors to help build their own capacity over time. This should be accompanied by the formalization of the serious organized crime team within the Police Division, with adequate resources and funding, and the

establishment of serious organized crime support units in missions with a serious organized crime mandate. In close coordination with UNODC, INTERPOL and bilateral donors, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will thus be able to provide increasingly integrated assistance to host-State entities in establishing or consolidating transnational crime units and associated processes.

64. **Recommendation 14**. Adequate resources are required for Police Division backstopping support to special political missions. It currently provides support to UNSOM, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, as well as to the planning processes for Burundi, Colombia and Yemen. This has led to a severe stretching of resources specifically budgeted for backstopping support to peacekeeping operations, especially during start-up and transition phases. I encourage Member States to consider allocating appropriate resources for the backstopping of special political missions.

65. The implementation of my vision of a modern United Nations police also rests on the availability of key cross-cutting enablers, in particular the newest technologies to enhance situational awareness and protect United Nations personnel, as well as the consolidation of partnerships to create new global models of cooperation, so that the Police Division is fully capable of supporting United Nations police components in the implementation of their mandated tasks.

66. The United Nations police have served to protect people around the world, strengthening inclusive and representative institutions and States, while respecting and promoting human rights and exemplifying the values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. At great personal cost, they have generously executed their tasks, in extreme conditions, sometimes under imminent threat and immense pressure, to protect civilians and represent the fairest principles of law and order. I extend my heartfelt admiration and gratitude to these brave men and women, who have, time and again, demonstrated their deep commitment to the ideals and goals of the United Nations.

67. I approach the end of my tenure as Secretary-General with continued concern over the many challenges facing the United Nations. The present report sets out my vision of how the United Nations police, when given strategic, realistic and adequately resourced mandates, can contribute to the sustainment of peace in the broadest sense. It sets out recommendations that reflect the findings of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, my report on the implementation of those findings and the external review of the functions, structure and capacity of the Police Division, as well as other global United Nations initiatives. I trust that my successor will give these recommendations strong consideration, with a view to advancing the development of more timely, tailored and effective United Nations prevention and conflict management responses, recognizing that the United Nations police can and should play a central role in these efforts.

United Nations S/2016/953

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following important information:

The Government of the Israeli occupiers has continued its acts of aggression against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic in support of its allied armed terrorist groups, which have been listed by the Security Council as terrorist organizations, including, in particular, the Nusrah Front. In the afternoon of Wednesday, 9 November 2016, Israeli aircraft brazenly attacked Syrian military position in the countryside of Qunaytirah governorate, causing material damage. The Security Council and the States Members of the United Nations should note, in particular, that this Israeli act of aggression was carried out in order to support armed terrorist groups that were attempting a widespread attack against the town of Hadar and its environs in the Qunaytirah countryside. Although those terrorist groups failed miserably in achieving any of their goals, the attack nonetheless killed nine innocent civilians and injured many of the town's residents, some of whom sustained serious injuries.

This fresh Israeli attack against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic is a blatant violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that was concluded in 1974 and a direct threat to regional security and peace. This attack also reveals the true face of the Israeli Government, which provides all forms of unlimited support to armed terrorist groups, particularly the Nusrah Front, and does so unabashedly before the entire world and without fear of punishment.

Syria calls on the Security Council and the States Members of the United Nations to condemn this act of aggression and put pressure on Israel to halt its support of armed terrorist groups and to respect the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and abide by its provisions.

Over the past few days, including Wednesday, 9 November 2016, the Nusrah Front and affiliated terrorist organizations, particularly the Nur al-Din Zanki movement, which is backed by the Turkish regime, fired rockets and so-called hell fire cannons at the Aleppo University campus, which houses many refugees and university students. This attack killed six civilians and injured 20 others, all of

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whom were students or civilians who had been displaced by the crimes committed by the terrorists and forced to take shelter in the campus.

Yesterday, a number of persons were killed and wounded in the village of Fu'a when it was attacked by the Army of Conquest, which has laid siege to the towns of Fu'a and Kafraya for more than two years and to which the United Nations has not been able to deliver food assistance, a situation that has been completely ignored by certain permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. In addition, the so-called Army of Islam terrorist organization, which is backed by Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist regime, fired mortar shells at the environs of the city of Harasta in eastern Rif Dimashq, killing one person and injuring three others, and causing heavy material damage to the property of civilians and their sources of livelihood.

As we have stressed in our previous identical letters, the terrorist nature of these organizations is demonstrated by the crimes that the armed terrorist groups have committed against innocent civilians in Aleppo and their use of its residents as human shields; the repeated attacks against western Aleppo, Kafraya and Fu'a that are being carried out by the so-called Army of Conquest, of which the Nusrah Front constitutes the largest component; and the crimes that were committed by the Nusrah Front and affiliated organizations when they attacked the town of Hadar in the Qunaytirah countryside, killing nine persons and injuring many others. These terrorist organizations are funded, armed and given shelter by the Wahhabist regime of Saudi Arabia and the Qatari and Turkish regimes, and receive encouragement, unfortunately, from the Governments of Security Council member States, such as Britain, France and the United States. In one day alone, terrorist attacks directed against Syrians took the lives of 17 civilians and injured 27 innocent children, women and disabled persons. Yet the above-mentioned States, which trumpet how civilized they are and how much they respect human rights, did not utter a word of condolence in response to those attacks.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic underscores that the terrorist killing machine that is targeting the children, women and elderly of Syria will not be stopped until the foreign support for terrorism provided by those States that are hostile to Syria is halted. Syria stresses that the fundamental battle, the one in which all sincere actors around the world must be engaged, is the battle against the terrorism perpetrated by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Nusrah Front and associated terrorist organizations. The threat that those organizations pose will not be confined to Iraq, Syria and certain other States of the region, but will spread to the rest of the States in the region and then throughout the world.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/954

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 November 2016

Original: English

Identical letters dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have been asked by my Government to inform you that, in a major escalation, Indian occupation forces used artillery in the Shahkot and Jura sectors of the line of control in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir yesterday, 9 November 2016. This was the first use of such weapons in 13 years, and was a clear indication of the Indian intention to further escalate tensions and undermine regional peace and security. It seeks to divert international attention from its continued violations of human rights in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

The occupation forces have been engaged in unprovoked firing and ceasefire violations on both sides of the line of control and the working boundary. The frequency of these violations has increased over the last two months. Indiscriminate firing and shelling, deliberately targeting civilian-populated areas, have resulted in 26 civilian casualties and injury to another 107 civilians, including women and children, in the past two months.

Pakistan has condemned these continued ceasefire violations, which are a contravention of the 2003 ceasefire understanding, as well as of international law.

India has also continued its non-cooperative attitude and denial of access to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which has been mandated to maintain peace and tranquillity on the line of control and the working boundary. Pakistan, of course, fully cooperates and provides unhindered access to UNMOGIP on its side of the line of control and the working boundary.

As the custodian of international peace and security, we call upon the Security Council to take note of these continued ceasefire violations by India, as they present a real danger to regional peace and security.

It is requested that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council, in connection with the item entitled "The India-Pakistan question".

(*Signed*) Maleeha **Lodhi**

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United Nations A/71/611–S/2016/955

General Assembly
Security Council

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11 November 2016

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 41 and 73 (a)

Question of Cyprus

Oceans and the law of the sea

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I regret to bring to your attention the signing, on 10 October 2016, of a so-called framework "agreement" on cooperation regarding energy matters, between Turkey and its secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus. This framework "agreement" provides for the establishment of an electricity connection between Turkey and the occupied areas of Cyprus through submarine cables and also envisages collaboration on a range of other issues, such as oil, natural gas and renewable energy.

While such an "agreement" remains legally invalid under international law, it constitutes yet another deliberate act of provocation by Turkey aimed at further consolidating its effective political and economic control over the occupied part of Cyprus, deepening the existing division and creating new faits accomplis on the ground.

In a letter dated 8 March 2016 addressed to you (A/70/780-S/2016/228), we expressed grave concern regarding the water connection between Turkey and the occupied part of Cyprus, which constitutes yet another illegal act in the context of Turkey's systematic policy of promoting the political and economic integration of the occupied part of Cyprus.

Beyond its grave political consequences, the serious legal and technical repercussions should also be highlighted. Turkey stands in violation of fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.[1] As the occupying Power, Turkey is in breach of its obligations under article 43 of the annex to the Fourth Hague

[1] The applicability of the rules of international humanitarian law to the Cypriot situation has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights: see *Varnava and Others v. Turkey* (Grand Chamber), 18 September 2009, paragraph 185.

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Convention of 1907, of the equivalent article of the Hague Convention of 1899 and of article 64 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect the laws of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is fully bound, under both conventional and customary international law, to fulfil the aforementioned obligations.

Furthermore, the laying of submarine cables in the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Cyprus will constitute a further blatant violation of the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus. The signing of any such agreement lies outside the ambit of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Cyprus-related United Nations resolutions.

The signing of the aforementioned "agreement" occurred during an extremely critical phase of the negotiating process for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. While Turkey alleges that it supports the current negotiating process and wishes a speedy settlement of the Cyprus problem, it undertakes actions demonstrating its mistrust of the process and a deliberate effort to interfere with its outcome by creating new conditions to its own benefit.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has always showed its readiness to respond to requests for electricity supply to the population residing in the occupied part of Cyprus during occasions of shortage due to mechanical failures or high demand. Furthermore, it welcomed the decision to proceed with the synchronization of the electricity grids in Cyprus as a confidence-building measure. It can thus be safely assumed that this project's real aim is not to respond to any genuine need but, on the contrary, to cement the illegal division of the island and to strengthen the secessionist entity's economic and political subordination to Turkey.

At this stage, all parties involved, notably Turkey, should redouble their efforts towards the solution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of Cyprus, thus creating the conditions for a holistic use of infrastructure for island-wide development and prosperity. Any actions that are not in compliance with this imperative need and international law not only complicate the negotiating process, but also undermine the much-needed trust between the two communities and the efforts to maintain a conducive climate at this very critical juncture.

Therefore, my Government kindly requests your assistance in conveying a strong message to Ankara to the effect that the Republic of Turkey must comply with international law, respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and refrain from creating new faits accomplis, which jeopardize the peace process and deepen the division of the island.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 41 and 73 (a), and of the Security Council, and have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in the next Law of the Sea Bulletin.

(*Signed*) Menelaos **Menelaou**
Chargé d' affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2016/956

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 November 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 11 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for 8-10 November 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for these bulletins to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vladimir **Safronkov**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 11 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (8 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of six populated areas in Hama (4) and Ladhiqiyah (2) governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 910.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Sham in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 69.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 45 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (19), Damascus governorate (20), Ladhiqiyah governorate (4), Hama governorate (1) and Dar'a governorate (1).

Armed groups that had announced a cessation of hostilities used improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on Azizi in Aleppo governorate and the Ansari and Mashariqah neighbourhoods in Aleppo city; Bilaliyah, Duma, Harasta, Baytima, Jawbar and the area at elevation point 612 in Damascus governorate; and Ayn al-Qantarah and Karmil in Ladhiqiyah governorate. A strike was carried out on Rasha in Ladhiqiyah governorate using an unmanned aerial vehicle with an explosive device on board.

Armed units of terrorist groups using improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms fired on Ansari in Aleppo governorate and also on the Assad Military Academy (four times), the Castello trade centre (twice), the Ard al-Sabbagh, Layramun, Hamdaniyah-4, 3000, Halab al-Jadidah, 1070 and Ramusah districts and the area near the paperboard factory and the former military school in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled by terrorists: Irbin (three times), Hawsh Nasri (twice), Bala al-Jadidah, Harasta and Harasta al-Qantarah, the Adawi neighbourhood in Damascus city, a sports ground and a power plant in Jawbar (twice) and the Ibn al-Walid hospital (twice).

Terrorists shelled Gusbarah in Ladhiqiyah governorate; Muhradah in Hama governorate; and Ibta' in Dar'a governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours five humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

1.9 tons to Shaqqa in Suwayda' governorate;

3 tons to the Akramiyah district (Bara' mosque) in Aleppo city;

1.5 tons to Dayr Mama in Hama governorate.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (9 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of four populated areas in Hama (3) and Ladhiqiyah (1) governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 914.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Sham in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 69.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 48 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (16), Damascus governorate (20), Ladhiqiyah governorate (9), Hama governorate (2) and Suwayda' governorate (1).

Armed groups that had announced a cessation of hostilities used improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-aircraft guns, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on the Ansari neighbourhood of Aleppo city; Duma, Aysem al-Fawqa, Mazra'at Mahmud, Bilaliyah, Jawbar, Bala al-Qadimah, Harasta and the area at elevation point 612 in Damascus governorate; and Ta'uma, Ayn Al-Qantarah, Kinsibba, Daghdaghan, Sandiran, Rasha, the area at elevation point 629 and Abu Ali mountain in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

Armed units of terrorist groups using improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, mortars and small arms fired on Ansari in Aleppo governorate and also on the Hamdaniyah-4, 3000, Karm al-Tarrab, Binyamin, 1070, Ramusah and Layramun neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy (three times), the Castello trade centre (twice) and areas near the paperboard factory and the former military school.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Jawbar (three times), Irbin (four times), Hawsh Nasri (twice), Qabun, the Adawi neighbourhood and the Wafidin camp.

In Hama governorate, terrorists shelled the thermal electric power station in Muhradah (twice).

Other populated areas subjected to shelling were Marj Shili in Ladhiqiyah governorate and Tall al-Gharbi hill in Suwayda' governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

2 tons to Masyaf in Hama governorate;

Approximately 1 ton to Marj Shili in Ladhiqiyah governorate;

3 tons to al-Khalidiyah (Ghaliyah-Farhat School, Zekwa Gazel School) in Aleppo city.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (10 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of four populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate (2), Damascus governorate (1) and Homs governorate (1).

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 918.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Mu'addamiyat al-Sham in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups which have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 69.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 41 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate (18), Aleppo governorate (17), Ladhiqiyah governorate (5), and Dar'a governorate (1).

Armed groups that had announced a cessation of hostilities used improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and small arms to fire on Harasta, Jawbar, Baliyah, Duma and the area at elevation point 612 in Damascus governorate; the Salah al-Din neighbourhood in Aleppo city; and Kara Jagez, Rasha, the area at elevation point 629 and government troop positions on Abu Ali mountain in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

In Ayn al-Qantarah in Ladhiqiyah governorate, illegal armed groups used a drone fitted with an explosive device.

Armed units of terrorist groups using tanks, mortars and small arms fired on Irbin and Hawsh Nasri in Damascus governorate, the Wafidin camp and the Ibn al-Walid Hospital near Duma and a sports ground in Jawbar.

In Aleppo governorate, terrorists shelled Shurfah and also the 3000, Layramun and Karm al-Tarrab neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy, the Castello trade centre, Hikmah School and areas near the paperboard factory and the former military school in Aleppo city.

In Dar'a governorate, terrorists shelled Izra'.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

1.5 tons to al-Tunah in Hama governorate;

Approximately 1 ton to Haffah in Ladhiqiyah governorate;

1 ton to the Shaykh Abu Bak district in Aleppo city.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

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Security Council

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11 November 2016

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Letter dated 8 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1983 (2011), in which the Council invited me to provide further information, as appropriate, relating to urgent and coordinated international action to curb the impact of the AIDS epidemic in conflict and post-conflict situations.

In the five years since the adoption of resolution 1983 (2011), there have been many developments in the global effort to combat the AIDS epidemic. There has been tremendous progress in the expansion of medical treatment for people living with HIV, resulting in a significant decline in the number of AIDS-related deaths. At the same time, however, the number of new infections among adults has remained steady at an estimated 1.9 million annually. In the light of these two independent trends, conflict-related disruption of life-saving HIV treatment is likely to become more common. The goal of ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030, as reflected in Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals, is important in both conflict and post-conflict settings. Achieving this goal will require strengthening our collaborative efforts.

During the June 2016 high-level meeting on ending AIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations organized a side event entitled "HIV and security: past, present and future". Participants cautioned that HIV and high-risk social drivers such as sexual violence during conflicts and humanitarian crises must be squarely addressed both during and after conflicts and in humanitarian crises.

In parallel with the high-level meeting, UNAIDS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a review of the implementation of resolution 1983 (2011). While the Security Council in that resolution called for a global response to curb HIV/AIDS in conflict and post-conflict situations, with support from Member States, United Nations entities and international financial institutions, the review focused on the critical role of peacekeeping operations as a part of the global effort.

The review found that there was near universal provision of HIV-related training and services to United Nations peacekeeping personnel, while the integration of HIV service delivery in mandated activities was dependent on a number of factors, including the mandate of the mission, available resources and partnerships with other United Nations entities. In addition, the review highlighted the need for links

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between efforts to address HIV and efforts to address sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence. It also pointed out the need to further reinforce system-wide United Nations cooperation to address HIV in emergency settings, including conflict and post-conflict situations, to apply the latest knowledge and to ensure the most effective use of limited resources.

The review found that at least six peacekeeping operations[1] had incorporated HIV-related communications and outreach into mandated mission tasks. Those missions contributed to national AIDS responses by providing HIV sensitization and awareness training to national military forces, national police forces, ex-combatants and internally displaced persons, training peer educators within national uniformed services and extending voluntary HIV testing and counselling, condom distribution and post-exposure prophylaxis to the host population. The extent to which external HIV activities are integrated into the mandated tasks depends on the scope of the mission mandate, the levels of human and financial resources available and the level of collaboration with other United Nations entities and partners. Such collaboration also facilitates a smoother transition to United Nations post-conflict support.

Since the adoption of resolution 1983 (2011), there has been a stronger recognition of the links between sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and increased risk of HIV infection. In its resolution 2106 (2013), the Security Council urged United Nations entities, Member States and donors to support the development and strengthening of capacities of national health systems and civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls living with or affected by HIV and AIDS in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. Women's protection advisers and focal points in several missions[2] have been mainstreaming HIV/AIDS considerations in their advocacy, political engagements and preventive measures. However, it is necessary to strengthen action to address those links.

In its resolution 1983 (2011), the Security Council requested me to strengthen ongoing work to prevent and combat sexual exploitation and abuse. In my report on combating sexual exploitation and abuse (A/71/97), not only did I reiterate my strong belief that this Organization should never remain silent or indifferent in the face of reported incidents, irrespective of the perpetrators, but also I laid out a comprehensive strategy to ensure that United Nations entities work actively and in unity.

The response to AIDS has moved from emergency management of a global crisis to a systematic effort to deliver HIV-related services at the level required to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. Data trends underscore the importance of continued engagement by the United Nations within conflict and post-conflict settings during this phase of the response.

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[1] The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).

[2] The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS and UNOCI.

To ensure the most effective use of the limited resources available to the United Nations system, the review recommended strengthening the architecture for joint United Nations action against AIDS in emergency settings, including conflict and post-conflict situations, to reflect the most recent international commitments on AIDS and conflict-related sexual violence, and applying the latest knowledge on effective responses to HIV in a variety of settings. That should include an updated cooperation framework among relevant United Nations entities that extends beyond UNAIDS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to support responses to AIDS in emergency settings and that reflects the comparative advantages, roles and responsibilities of each entity. Such a framework should clearly define who does what on the ground and at Headquarters.

I count on your support and endorsement of the continuation of this important work, which I encourage my successor to take forward.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Security Council

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11 November 2016

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Malaysia on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 11 November 2016 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations stating that Colonel Mohamad Suria bin Mohamad Saad and Ms. Delfina Jane Aloysius Dris have been appointed alternate representatives of Malaysia on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

16-19971 (E) 151116

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